North Korea - why China ain't gonna rock the boat.

I write as the Western World wags its finger at Kim Jeong Eun and co for attempting to fire a rocket into orbit, which they claim was to celebrate the 100 years anniversary of the birth of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung. Although the rocket launch was a failure, the fact that North Korea could even attempt it, despite universal international condemnation, shows just how little traction anyone has over Pyongyang.

Looks nice. Didn't work though.

Coincidentally, last week I attended a talk by esteemed Russian academic Andrei Lankov on the topic of “What does China want in North Korea, and what can be done about it?”. So it seems a fitting time for me to say a few words about how these different events and actors relate to one another, and especially why China behaves as it does to the DPRK – seemingly, letting it get away with murder, both figuratively and literally.

Andrei Lankov is a Russian professor who has studied in Russia and North Korea.  He can speak Korean, English and his native Russian, and I think he can speak some Chinese too. He has some high-level diplomatic contacts in several governments in the region, and has about half a dozen books published to his name. The guy knows his stuff. His views on China were well-informed and illustrated with reference to history, to recent conversations he’s had with well-placed government sources in Beijing and Seoul, as well as non-governmental sources in North Korea.

I will be plagiarizing Lankov extensively here. If you take an interest, I suggest you read his books, or at the very least, check out his columns for the Korea Times.

China seems to be the only country with any kind of influence over North Korea, yet they seem unable or unwilling to really effect any change on their ally. Whereas, a generation ago, perhaps, this could be explained by Cold War strategic alliances, or an ideological bond based on a shared commitment to ‘communism’, these arguments now both seem obsolete – the Cold War is over, and China’s market economy seems a world apart from anything resembling Pyongyang’s version (or, for that matter, any version) of ‘Marxism’.

Crucially, Lankov argues that China’s influence over NK is often vastly overstated by the western media. In reality, NK often ignores China’s advice, and the relationship between the two countries is cordial but underscored with deep mistrust. Kim Il Sung’s ideology of ‘Juche’ is one of self-sufficiency and independence  - although one could convincingly argue that economic stagnation, famine, and a reliance on food aid and have showed that to be an utter failure - NK is suspicious of China and keen not to become its satellite or puppet. 

Kim Jong Il is overjoyed to meet China's Wen Jiabao. (2009)

 

So China can’t do much about North Korea, and, even if it could, it wouldn’t. Why? Well, Lankov argues that China’s attitude can be understood, not in terms of ideology, or even economic links, but in terms of strategic aims, which he describes as follows.

As Lankov put it, China has three key aims regarding North Korea:

1. Stability on the Korean peninsula
2. A divided peninsula
3. A non-nuclear peninsula

These aims are hierarchical: Aim 1 – stability, is the paramount aim, and China will sacrifice the other aims to maintain a stable Korean neighbour.  Likewise, China will sacrifice Aim 3, if it means Aims 2 and 1 can be maintained.

Look at the aims in reverse order, and things start to make a little more sense.

why China is interested in accessing the Korean East Coast

 Aim 3 – a non-nuclear peninsula - is important to China because China doesn’t trust the NK military with nuclear weapons, and, moreover, China wants to maintain its privileged position in the ‘Nuclear Club’, as one of only half a dozen nuclear states in the world. Also, China fears that if (or rather, when) the NK regime falls, nuclear materials could fall into the wrong hands.

However, if NK does become a nuclear-armed state (as looks increasingly likely), China would reluctantly accept that, if it meant that aims 1 and 2 were assured.

Aim 2: a divided peninsula - is important to China because China doesn’t want South Korean (and, more importantly, US) armed forces, near its border. North Korea is a handy buffer zone against its rival superpower, America.

Also, China gets some strategic advantages from the existence of North Korea, like access to its eastern coast, which is helpful for Chinese sea- exports (which otherwise have to travel a very long way – see the map). If Korea became reunified, China could not be assured of such access by a united Korea controlled from Seoul, rather than by its allies in Pyongyang.

But the main Aim, Aim 1 – stability on the peninsula, is China’s over-riding concern. However much China may be embarrassed by the belligerent actions of Pyongyang, it does not want to risk the total meltdown of the regime, fearing, probably rightly, that it would precipitate violence, chaos, and a flood of refugees over the Chinese border. In such a scenario, China’s Army might have to intervene. 

China does not want to intervene militarily in what might be a rather messy expedition into Korea which could be economically and politically costly, and the sight of Chinese tanks in a foreign country would be a PR disaster.

So, however much it dislikes it, China would accept a nuclear North Korea rather than risk the meltdown of the whole regime, which would lead to a united Korea and at least an interim period of instability – therefore meaning aims 1 and 2 would not be secured.

However, Lankov argues that China could accept the reunification of Korea, if a situation arose that meant it was unavoidable. If, for example, the NK regime failed, then China would probably not prevent South Korea from filling the vacuum of power, and unifying the peninsula, so as to stabilize the peninsula as soon as possible. 

This seems to echo some of the information which wikileaks has unearthed, that China (for the reasons mentioned earlier) would not want to involve its military in Korea, although they would probably seek assurances that the US military would keep a certain distance away from the China-Korea border.

Seen thus, it can be understood why China behaves as it does. It is unwilling to do anything which might endanger the Pyongyang government’s ability to survive. China could, theoretically at least, cut all trade links with NK, stop sending food aid and isolate Pyongyang politically. This could help precipitate some kind of overthrow of the Kim government. 

But, firstly, China is not in the business of regime change (as can be seen by their complete reluctance to get involved in the Arab Spring), and in the case of Korea, it wants to maintain its strategic aims, as outlined above. The status quo might not be perfect, but the alternatives, for China at least, are worse.

If change is to happen in North Korea, it is likely to come from within rather than be imposed from without.

But, more on that....later.

Election fever and the National Assembly

Is election fever gripping Korea? As a foreigner, as with so many things here, it’s hard to say. One thing is certain: there is a general election coming this month, and the seats of the National Assembly are up for grabs. It looks likely that the ruling Grand National Party will lose their current majority to the new United Democratic party, which seems set to benefit from general disillusionment with President Lee Myeung Bak’s elitist policies, and a recent raft of stories about corruption and a lack of press freedom which have all damaged the GNP’s reputation.

On street corners and subway stations in Seoul and its satellite cities, one can see evidence of the political parties’ PR machines springing into action, some of which seem familiar to us foreigners, some certainly does not. The huge posters and billboards showing (photo-shopped?) pictures of smiling parliamentary candidates beaming down from shopping centre malls are certainly reminiscent of UK election campaigns; but the teams of brightly-clothed dancing women singing songs praising their party, to the sound of K-Pop music being pumped out of portable PA systems, seem very different indeed to anything I might see back home. It seems that Koreans sell their politicians like they sell most things: using in-your-face sights and sounds to grab people’s attention.

As all this is going on, I thought it was time to go to the National Assembly building in Yeuiodo, Seoul. Being a bit of politics geek, I’ve been to a few Parliament buildings in my time - the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the Australian Parliament in Canberra, the British Parliament in London – and thought I should see what it looks like in the Korean equivalent, to witness the the place which embodies the 'prize' for this month's election candidates.

 

The building is impressive and anyone who’s crossed the Han River in Seoul will certainly recognize the Roman-style pillars and green dome which house the country’s political nerve centre. As you’d expect, it’s on a prime piece of real estate: located riverside, right next to the towering skyscrapers of Seoul’s main business and finance district on the semi-island of Yeouido.

The whole Yeouido district has a strange sense of space, of planning, of calm purposefulness, which one doesn’t see often in the crammed streets of Seoul. Walking up to the National Assembly building itself, from its new, super-clean subway station along its tree-lined  front-lawn, one does feel impressed by the imposing architecture and unabashed sense of power and privilege. And inside too, it’s not a disappointment: marble floors and red carpets, shining statues and canvas paintings - they’ve done a good job to realize the grand ambitions of Park Chung-hee (the President who ordered the building of this place) to replace its Japanese-built predecessor with a parliament building Koreans can be proud of.

the dome is meant to signify...er.. something or other

There are two main chambers, but only one of them is used. The other is reserved for North Korea’s politicians: should reunification ever happen, they’re ready! The main chamber looks similar to the US Congress or the European Parliament: a semi-circular design with seats facing the Speak in the centre of the room. Each politician has their own touch-screen computer at their desk so they can vote on bills electronically. (Technologically miles ahead of the Westminster system where MPs still have to file into division lobbies and use actual pieces of paper to vote.)

The main chamber

The semi-circle design is supposed to engender a non-aggressive style of discussion, as opposed to the face-to-face design of the House of Commons in London. However, Korean politics is renowned for getting rather hot-headed at times, and there have been numerous occasions when the National Assembly has been the site of violence and chaos. With punches thrown, doors barricaded, and fire extinguishers and sledgehammers used as weapons, it makes the ya-boo of Westminster seem positively tame.

With our guide Mr. Shin in the Visitor Centre.

Our tour of the main building was brief but interesting. We also saw the Visitor Centre, where a very friendly and helpful Mr. Shin (who spoke great English) told us some more trivia about the Assembly’s history and how it all worked. There are also some exhibits about the country’s political past and there’s a mock-up of the President’s own desk, where for a few minutes you can fulfil all your fantasies of POWER!!!! ( and I have plenty of them).

El Pres.

The National Assembly is the perfect place to visit to get a feel for how Korean politics works, and (for non-politics geeks) to experience a beautiful piece of living, working architecture at first-hand. 

It certainly would be a nice building to call your ‘workplace’ - you can see why, in the run-up to this month’s elections, so many would-be Korean Politicians will be fighting (and singing, and dancing) so hard to get a job in there.

The National Assembly is free to visit, but you will need to book at least 3 days ahead. A tour of the main building and visitor centre shouldn't take you more than 2 hours. Go to http://korea.assembly.go.kr/com/guide_01.jsp for more information. Tours can be in Korean or English upon request.